Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (1989) to include two -instead of onereproduction periods. We examine how the cost structure of early and late children in terms of time and goods a¤ects the optimal fertility timing. Then, focusing a stationary equilibrium with stationary population, we provide two alternative explanations for the observed postponement of births: (1) a fall of the direct cost of late children (thanks to medical advances); (2) a rise in hourly productivity, which increases the (relative) opportunity costs of early children in comparison to late children.
Introduction
As this is well-known among demographers, human fertility has exhibited a globally decreasing pattern during the last century. At the world's level, the total fertility rate (TFR) has decreased from about 5.2 children per women in 1900 to about 2.7 children per women in 2000.
1 Another well documented stylized fact concerns not the number, but the timing of births: there has been, over the last three decades, a global tendency towards the postponement of parenthood. That stylized fact is illustrated by Figure 1 , which shows the rise in the mean age at motherhood in several advanced economies, over 1985-2005. Another way to illustrate the postponement of births consists of decomposing the total fertility rate into the average number of children per women in the early part of the reproduction period (i.e. between ages 15 and 34 years), and the average number of children per women in the late part of the reproduction period (i.e. between ages 35 and 49 years).
3 As shown on Figure 2 , whereas the total fertility rate has remained relatively constant over the period , late fertility has signi…cantly increased over time. For instance, whereas children born from a mother older than 35 years amounted to only 7.5 percents of US births in 1985, that proportion jumped to about 14 percents in 2005.
Can economic models of fertility, such as the Barro Becker (1989) framework, provide some plausible explanation or rationalization of that stylized fact?
4 At …rst glance, the answer seems to be negative, since that model includes, as most dynamic models with endogenous fertility, a unique reproduction period. However, that model can be extended, so as to introduce several reproduction periods, instead of a single one. The goal of this paper is precisely to provide such an extension of the Barro Becker (1989) model. For that purpose, we keep the fundamental structure of the Barro Becker model: overlapping generations, physical capital accumulation, dynastic altruism, but we add one reproduction period, in such a way as to be able to examine whether the observed postponement of births can or cannot be rationalized by an economy à la Barro and Becker. Given that we are here only interested in the timing of fertility, we will, when discussing how to rationalize the postponement of births, assume that the total fertility rate equals the replacement level, and study the lifecycle distribution of births.
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Anticipating on our results, we …rst show that, at the temporary equilibrium, the cost structure of early and late children, in terms of goods and time, is a key determinant of the optimal fertility pro…le. If late children are more costly than early children during their childhood, and if early children are no longer timeconsuming once adult, the optimal fertility pro…le only involves early children. If, however, early children are, once adult, still time-consuming for their parents, that additional opportunity cost provides some incentive for postponing fertility. Then, focusing on a stationary equilibrium with stationary population size, we show that improvements in total factor productivity tend, under general conditions, to shift steady-state optimal fertility pro…les towards more late births. Hence the extended Barro Becker model proposes two explanations for the postponement of births: either a change in the direct cost of early and late children, or, alternatively, a rise in total factor productivity.
In sum, the extended Barro Becker model is shown to be able to rationalize the observed postponement of births. As such, that model complements all static frameworks studying the optimal timing of births (Happel et al 1984 , Cigno and Ermisch 1989 , Gusta¤son 2001 , as well as dynamic frameworks also focusing on lifecycle fertility patterns, but using alternative assumptions, such as D'Albis et al (2010) and Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011). 6 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies lifecycle fertility at the temporary equilibrium. Section 4 examines the timing of births at a stationary equilibrium with stationary population. Empirical material on total factor productivity and fertility timing in the U.S. and the OECD is studied in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Let us consider a three-period OLG model. The three periods are: childhood, young adulthood and old adulthood. Agents work the entire time-period in young adulthood and old adulthood. Reproduction is monosexual. Agents can have children either at the beginning of young adulthood (i.e. second period), or at the beginning of old adulthood (i.e. third period). The number of early children for a young adult at time t is denoted by n t , while the number of late children for a young adult at time t is denoted by m t+1 .
Following Barro and Becker (1989) , we assume that parents are altruistic towards young family members. Parents'utility depends on own consumption at young adulthood (denoted by c t ) and at old adulthood (denoted by d t+1 ), and on the number and the utility of younger family members. The utility of an agent who is a young adult at time t is represented by the utility function:
( 1) where v( ) is the utility from consumption, is a time-preference factor, and the weighting function a( ) represents the weight assigned by a young adult belonging to the adult cohort at period t, of size N t , to the welfare of each family member belonging to the adult cohort t + 1, of size N t+1 . The number of young adults at time t + 1, N t+1 , includes his own children, whose number is N t n t , as well as the late children of his parents, i.e. his young brothers and sisters, whose number is N t 1 m t . Thus the number of family members who are young adults at time t > 0 is denoted by N t+1 = N t n t +N t 1 m t . 7 That number of descendants can also be rewritten as:
where g t+1
Nt+1
Nt is the (adult) cohort growth factor, equal to n t + mt gt . The family weighting function a( ) has the following form:
6 D'Albis et al (2010) focus on optimal lifecycle fertility in a continuous time OLG model, under the assumption of a decreasing relationship between the total number of children and the timing of births. Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011) focus on the optimal fertility timing in an OLG model à la Samuelson (1976) , and examine whether the Serendipity Theorem still holds in a broader demographic environment with several reproduction periods instead of one. 7 We assume, to avoid any period without births, that N 1 = N 0 = 1, and that m 1 = 0.
where 0 < < 1 and 0 < " < 1. That functional form is a generalization of the one in Barro and Becker (1989) , where g t+1 = n t (as m t = 0). 8 Note also that substituting for a(N t+1 ; N t ) in expression (1) yields:
That expression generalizes the utility function used in Barro and Becker (1989) , where all children are born from young parents (i.e. g t+1 = n t ), yielding:
In the Barro Becker setting, the unique fertility rate n t serves as the investment rate in the future. Here, in our framework with two reproduction periods, that investment rate in the future equals g t+1 n t + mt gt . Substituting repeatedly for a cohort's utility in the utility function of the dynastic head, we obtain the following dynastic utility function:
That expression collapses to Barro and Becker's standard dynastic utility function when old adulthood does not matter ( = 0) and when there are no births in third period, i.e. m t = 0 for all t, in which case
The dynastic head treats equally the welfare of two descendants born at the same point in time, even though one is related to him through a lower number of family ties than the other. The underlying intuition is that, even though there may be di¤erences, in the short-term, between grand children and grandgrand-grand children, those di¤erences appear minor once the dynasty includes a su¢ ciently large number of generations.
The elasticity of v ( ) with respect to consumption is assumed to be constant:
where < 1. That assumption is also made in Barro Becker (1989) . 8 Indeed, in Barro-Becker, we have
Here that formula is generalized, to obtain a ( ) N t+1 = g 1 " t+1 even when g t+1 6 = nt as a consequence of mt > 0. 9 Note that the above dynastic utility function keeps the standard properties of the one derived by Barro and Becker (1989) . If one had used, instead of expression (1), another utility function, such as, for instance:
with a( ) concave in its argument, one would not have been able to derive a dynastic utility function with the same simple form as expression (6). Indeed, the altruistic weighting function is non linear, so that a (n 0 n 1 ) + a(m 1 ) 6 = a(n 0 n 1 + m 1 ), implying that the dynastic utility function can hardly be reduced to an in…nite sum of lifetime welfare terms weighted by the (concavi…ed) size of the di¤erent successive cohorts, as in Barro Becker (1989) and in (6).
Each adult earns a wage w t on time supplied to the market, in young adulthood and old adulthood. Since we de…ne an adult's total time available per period to be 1 unit, w t and w t+1 denote the total labour income in, respectively, young adulthood and old adulthood, in the case of no children.
Following Barro and Becker (1989) , we assume that a child costs, during his childhood, a fraction b of the time unit of parents, so that parents having n t children can only work during a period 1 bn t at young adulthood. Similarly, parents who have m t+1 late children can only work a fraction 1 Bm t+1 of their second working period. It is widely documented that a late child is more costly than an early child, so that we have: B b.
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However, the duration of coexistence of the parent with a child is longer with an early child than with a late child, and this may induce some additional time costs at older adulthood. We represent those extra time costs by the fraction h 0. The intuition is that early children are not only "enjoyed" longer than late children, but they also require some time once they are young adults. The source of asymmetry in comparison with late children is that late children become adults when their parents are retired, unlike early children, who become adults when their parents are still working. This di¤erence creates an asymmetry in the lifetime opportunity costs of early and late children.
Within the Barro-Becker (1989) setting, there is only one adult life-period. As a consequence, there is no savings: the only way to transfer resources over time is through bequests to children, each adult parent giving, in the last period of his life, a bequest to his children. Here, on the contrary, adulthood includes two periods, during which the agents works and can have children. The introduction of an additional life-period tends to complicate the analysis. Hence, we will make here three assumptions, which insure analytical solvability:
Young individuals can save resources for the future.
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All children, whatever these are born from young or old parents, receive their bequests at the same point in their lifetime, that is, at the beginning of young adulthood (i.e. the majority age).
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All children who live in the same time period receive exactly the same bequest from their parents, whatever those parents are young or old.
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Under those assumptions, a young adult at time t, whatever he is born from 1 0 On the cost di¤erential between early and late children, see Gustafsson (2001) . 1 1 The introduction of savings allows us to characterize the agent's intertemporal budget constraint even if he has no children early in life.
1 2 One can interpret this as parental will to give an equal chance to all children, early and late. On the analytical side, that assumption helps a lot. If children received their bequests at the time of the death of their parent, then their lifetime budget constraint would di¤er, depending on whether they are born from young or old parents (see below).
1 3 According to that assumption, only the timing of life determines the bequest one receives, and not the age of parents. The underlying idea is that, from the point of view of the dynastic head, a late child and an early grand child are similar, since they are alive at the same point in time, and, thus, equally "distant" from the dynastic head. young or old parents, faces the budget constraint:
where (1 + r t )k t is the bequest received by the young adult from his parent, s t is savings, e t is the cost of an early child in terms of resources, b is the fraction of time dedicated to the rearing of each early child, and n t k t+1 are the resources he saves to provide a bequest to his early children. The amount n t k t+1 is invested in the production process, and then given, with interests, to the children born at t once these are adults. Thus each of those children receives:
At the next period, the adult agent faces the budget constraint:
where E t+1 is the cost of a late child in terms of resources, B is the fraction of time dedicated to each late child, and h is the fraction of time dedicated to early children once adults. Given that the cost of a late child is generally larger than the cost of an early child, the assumption E t e t is reasonable. 14 The amount m t+1 k t+2 constitutes the resources that the parent saves to provide a bequest to his late children. The amount m t+1 k t+2 is invested in the production process, and then given, with interests, to the children born at t + 1 once these are adults. Each of those late children receives:
Substituting for savings in the young age budget constraint yields the individual's intertemporal budget constraint:
That intertemporal budget constraint is the same for all agents, whatever these are born from young or old parents. That result would not prevail if children received their bequests at the death of their parents.
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Substituting repeatedly for k t in the intertemporal budget constraint, we obtain the following dynastic budget constraint: (11) 1 4 On the cost di¤erential between early and late children, see Gusta¤son (2001) . 1 5 If children received their bequest at the death of their parent, the overall budget constraints of agents born at the same point in time would di¤er, depending on whether they are born from young or from old parents. Individuals born from old parents receiving the bequests earlier in their lifecycle, they bene…t, thanks to a larger opportunity set for savings, from more resources on the lifetime, ceteris paribus, than individuals born from young adults, who need to wait more to get the bequest. See the Appendix on this.
where 1+rs) . That constraint states that the present value of all resources (LHS) must be equal to the present value of all expenditures. In comparison with the standard Barro-Becker setting, the LHS and the RHS di¤er by the presence of third-period consumption on the RHS, and, also, by the de…ni-tion of the number of descendants, N t , equal here to N t 1 n t 1 + mt 1Nt 2 Nt 1 .
Temporary equilibrium
The optimization problem faced by the dynastic head consists of maximizing utility U 0 subject to the dynastic budget constraint, subject to the initial assets k 0 , and subject to the initial young adult cohort size N 0 = 1. Through that maximization problem, each agent takes as given the path of wage rates w t and of interest rates r t , and selects a path for consumption at the young age and old age for all descendants, c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , :::
::, bequests per young adult, k 1 , k 2 , ::: and age-speci…c fertility rates, n 0 ; n 1 ; n 2 ; ::: and m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ; :::.
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The dynastic head's problem can be written as follows:
First-order condition for optimal consumption of a young adult at time t is:
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the dynastic budget constraint. The FOC for optimal old-age consumption at period t + 1 is:
Combining those two FOCs yields:
Combining the FOC for optimal consumption of a young adult at t + 1 with the FOC for optimal consumption of a young adult at t, we have:
Thus the intergenerational consumption pro…le is increasing in the parameter , and decreasing in the cohort growth factor g t = Nt Nt 1 and in the interest rate. Similarly, for old-age consumption, we have:
Regarding the optimal demography, we know from the FOC for consumption that the optimal cohort growth factor g t+1 satis…es the condition:
The optimal cohort growth factor is increasing in parental altruism, and in the interest rate, but decreasing in the parameter ". If the interest rate is constant, and if the intergenerational consumption path is also invariant over time, the optimal cohort growth factor is also constant over time. But beyond those properties, that condition does not, on its own, su¢ ce to characterize, for any period, a unique optimal fertility pro…le (n t ; m t ), since various fertility pro…les (n t ; m t ) can bring the optimal cohort growth factor g t+1 , as long as (n t ; m t ) is such that n t + mt gt = g t+1 . Hence, to characterize the optimal fertility path, it is necessary to focus on the FOCs for optimal age-speci…c fertility.
Keeping in mind that the number of persons born at period t can be written as
, the FOCs for the optimal n t and m t are, respectively:
Those two FOCs are almost identical, except that these depend on how respectively n t and m t in ‡uence the number of individuals born at all subsequent periods t + 1; t + 2; :::. Although that e¤ect is complex -since any change in fertility is followed by changes in the number of descendants at all next generations -, the relationship N t = N t 1 g t = N t 1 n t 1 + 
Lemma 1
The partial derivatives of the number of descendants with respect to early and late fertility satisfy the following equation, for all t, j > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix. Thus whether the marginal e¤ect of a change in early fertility on the total number of descendants is superior or inferior to the marginal e¤ect of a change in late fertility depends on whether the population is growing or not, that is, on whether g t exceeds 1 or not. Substituting for this in the FOC for optimal m t , and simplifying yields:
That FOC can then be compared with the FOC for optimal n t . Several cases can arise, depending on the relative levels of early and late children in terms of time and goods.
Let us start with the simplest case. If there is perfect equality of all costs, i.e. b = B, e t = E t and h = 0, then the two FOCs are exactly identical. Thus, in that special case, the optimal early fertility rate n t and late fertility rate are determined jointly, by the same condition. The dynastic head's planning problem is thus underdetermined.
If, on the contrary, there is perfect equality of all costs, except that the early children still recommend some time at the adult age, i.e. h > 0. Then, it follows that the marginal welfare loss from increasing early fertility rate is always larger, ceteris paribus, than the marginal welfare loss from increasing the late fertility rate, since the RHS of the FOC for optimal n t always exceeds the one for optimal m t . We thus have the corner solution: n t = 0, m t > 0.
Alternatively, if there is no time costs of early children at the adult age (h = 0), but if late children have a larger cost, either in time or in goods, i.e. b B and e t < E t or b < B and e t E t , the marginal welfare loss from increasing early fertility is always smaller, ceteris paribus, than the marginal welfare loss from increasing late fertility, since the RHS of the FOC for optimal m t always exceeds the one for optimal n t . Hence, we have: n t > 0 and m t = 0.
Finally, when none of those conditions are satis…ed, the two FOCs are satis…ed simultaneously, and we have the interior optimum for the fertility pro…le as a whole: n t > 0 and m t > 0. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1
If b B and e t < E t or b < B and e t E t , as well as h = 0, the optimal fertility pro…le involves n t > 0 and m t = 0.
If b = B, e t = E t and h > 0, the optimal fertility pro…le involves n t = 0 and m t > 0.
If b = B, e t = E t and h = 0, the optimal fertility pro…le is indeterminate.
Otherwise, the optimal fertility pro…le involves n t > 0 and m t > 0.
Proof. See the above FOCs.
In sum, various fertility pro…les (n t ; m t ) can constitute the solution to the dynastic head's optimization problem, depending on the structure of early and late children costs in terms of goods and in terms of time. Therefore, the evolution of children cost structure is likely to have had a signi…cant impact on the timing of births. One can think, for instance, that recent medical advances, such as the development of assisted reproductive technologies, have strongly reduced the cost of late children, leading to the observed postponement of births. However, as we shall now see, that kind of "cost-based explanation" is not the unique possible one. Other explanations can account for the postponement of births, without relying on external changes in children costs structure.
Births postponement: theory
In order to identify other potential determinants of the change in the timing of births, let us …rst make some additional assumptions, concerning the production process, from which wages w t and interest rates r t are determined. In this paper, we assume, like Barro and Becker (1989) , a closed economy, where the wages and interest rates depend on the level of the stock of productive capital.
Production
Production takes place via a standard one-sector production function that exhibits constant returns to scale:
where Y t is total output, K t is total capital, and L t is total labour. As Barro Becker (1989), we assume no depreciation of physical capital. The total labour at period t can be written as:
The total capital stock at period t can be written as:
where the …rst term of the RHS coincides with the bequest received by individuals who are young adults at time t, whereas the second term is the savings from young adults at the previous period.
In intensive terms, we can denote the capital per worker t as:
Given constant returns to scale, we can rewrite the production process as:
with, as usual, f 0 ( t ) > 0, f 00 ( t ) < 0. Factors are assumed to be paid at their marginal productivities:
The interest rate is decreasing in t , while the wage rate is increasing in t .
Long-run fertility timing
The dynamics of our economy is quite complex, because there are not one, but three demographic variables: early fertility rate n t (like in Barro-Becker), but, also, late fertility rate m t , and the cohort growth factor g t = n t 1 + mt 1 gt 1 . Hence, to facilitate our analysis of the change in fertility timing, we will here assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium with a stationary population. That assumption can be justi…ed on the ground of analytical tractability, but, also, on the ground that an ever increasing or decreasing population is hardly plausible on a …nite Earth. Moreover, in the light of Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011) , it appears that, when the cohort growth factor g di¤ers from unity, stationary equilibria can, under some fertility pro…les, turn out to be unstable, making steady-state analysis irrelevant. Thus imposing a stationary population protects us against the possibility of unstable stationary equilibria, but without preventing the study of the optimal fertility timing.
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When there exists a stationary equilibrium, we know, since:
On the existence and stability of a stationary equilibrium with exogenous age-speci…c fertility rates n and m, see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011) . It is shown there that, although there exists, under mild conditions, a stationary equilibrium in an OLG model with two reproduction periods, the stability of that equilibrium requires n > 0. When n = 0, the economy exhibits cyclical dynamics around a stationary equilibrium, except when g equals 1, in which case there is a stable stationary equilibrium. that the cohort growth rate g t must be constant over time, and equal to:
Note that, for a given, constant, cohort growth factor g = 1, there exist various possible fertility pro…les (n; m). Indeed, any pair (n ; m ) such that:
is compatible with the stationary equilibrium with stationary cohort size.
To study the optimal fertility pro…le, let us go back to the conditions describing the optimal levels of n and m , and substitute for steady-state wages, interest rate, and child costs. Making those substitutions in the two FOCs and substituting for the Lagrange multiplier in the …rst FOC by means of the other FOC, we obtain the optimality condition:
That condition is necessary for the two FOCs to be satis…ed, that is, for an interior optimal fertility pro…le with n > 0, m > 0. It states that the marginal cost from an early child (LHS), in terms of goods (1st term) or in time (2nd and 3rd terms), must be exactly equal to the marginal cost from a late child (RHS), in terms of goods (1st term) and time (2nd term). On its basis, we can characterize the steady-state fertility pro…le.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy with a unique stable stationary equilibrium and a stationary population. Proof. See the Appendix. Proposition 2 allows us to propose a …rst explanation for the observed postponement of births. In the early stages of history, late children were extremely costly. Hence, the large levels of B and E push the economy towards case (i). However, as medical science has developed, the costs of late children have decreased substantially, pushing the economy towards case (ii), with interior optimal early and late fertility rates. But that stage may not be the end of the story: as the costs of late parenthood become closer and closer to those of early parenthood (i.e. B ! b and E ! e), the existence of a positive time cost for early children who become adults (i.e. h > 0) may push the economy towards case (iii), with a corner solution n = 0 and m = 1.
In sum, Proposition 2 proposes a cost-based explanation to the observed postponement of births. Over time, the structure of child costs would have evolved, with, as a consequence, a shift from early fertility to late fertility. Note that, whereas the shift from stage (i) (no late births) to stage (ii) (mixed fertility) as a result of medical advances reducing late children costs E could have been anticipated a priori, the shift from stage (ii) to stage (iii) is less trivial. That shift relies on the fact that children are durable consumption goods, who also involve a durable opportunity cost. Thus the model has the virtue to highlight the key role played by that durable time costs of children for the optimal fertility timing issue.
Although attractive, that explanation is not the unique possible one. Actually, we can also propose another explanation, which relies not on the structure of child costs, but on the evolution of the production process. To explore that explanation further, let us impose a particular functional form on the production process, i.e. the standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter, while is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. In intensive terms, the production process can be written as:
Hence, at the stationary equilibrium with stationary population, the steadystate capital level is:
from which we can deduce that the wages and interest rates are:
Substituting for wages and interest rates in the conditions of Proposition 2 allows us to study the impact of productivity shocks (through A) or changes in capital intensity (through ) on the optimal timing of births. The impact of factors a¤ecting the wage and the interest levels on the timing of fertility is particularly worth being studied in the case where B b h < 0, that is, when the total (discounted) proportion of labour time dedicated to early children along the whole career exceeds the total time dedicated to late children.
Corollary 1 Consider an economy with Cobb-Douglas production technology, with a unique stable stationary equilibrium and a stationary population. Assume e E < 0 and B b h < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the light of Corollary 1, we are able to propose a second explanation for the observed postponement of fertility. That alternative explanation relies on the changes in the characteristics of the production process. Indeed, we have, ceteris paribus:
Thus, when the economy bene…ts from a positive total factor productivity (TFP) shock, the wage, which is the LHS of the condition in Corollary 1, goes up. As a consequence, case (i) becomes less likely, and cases (ii) or (iii) more likely. If there is also a rise in the elasticity of output with respect to capital , the LHS of the condition goes down, which counteracts the change induced by the rise in TFP. But in periods of strong technological progress with quasi constant elasticity , there has to be a shift from early births towards late births.
In sum, beyond a change in the structure of children costs in terms of goods (i.e. a fall of E), one can also rationalize the observed tendency towards later fertility on the mere basis of a rise in TFP. A rise in TFP increases the opportunity cost of early children more than the one of late children, since the former, once adult, still consume some working time of their parents, contrary to late children, who only become adults when their parents are retired. Hence, provided other things remain equal (including children costs in terms of goods, e and E), the timing of births is modi…ed in the direction of later fertility. This constitutes an alternative explanation of the postponement of births.
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5 Births postponement: back to the data Let us now turn back to empirical facts, to investigate whether the productivitybased explanation of the observed postponement of births is compatible with the data. For that purpose, we will proceed in two stages, and focus …rst on cross section data for OECD countries, and, then, on time series for the U.S.
TFP and fertility timing in the OECD
A …rst, simple way to check the plausibility of the TFP-based explanation of the postponement of births consists of investigating whether economies with the largest TFP are also characterized by later births in the lifecycle. Naturally, such a correlation is only a clue supporting the above explanation provided the 1 8 That result is a comparative statics result, where A is the unique changing parameter. If, alternatively, one assumes that children costs e and E vary with TFP, then additional e¤ects have to be taken into account before drawing conclusions on the net e¤ect of TFP growth on fertility timing. But given that the e¤ect of changes in children costs in terms of goods was discussed above, we focus here on the pure e¤ect of a rise in TFP, under …xed e and E.
economies under study are close to each others on all relevant dimensions (i.e. same structural parameters in our model except TFP parameter A).
For that purpose, we use the study by Aiyar and Dalgaard (2005) , which provides estimates of TFP for 20 advanced economies over 1980-1990. The speci…city of Aiyar and Dalgaard is to use two distinct methodologies for TFP estimations: besides the standard estimation method based on data on stocks of inputs (which they call the "primal" approach), they also develop an alternative method, based on factor price data (called the "dual" approach).
19 On the fertility side, we rely here on age-speci…c fertility from the United Nations Population Division World Fertility Data 2008, which provides estimates of agespeci…c (period) fertility rates around the world, on the period 1970-2006. 20 Figure 3 plots 19 economies in the space (TFP rank, m/TFR rank) for 1990, using the primal TFP estimates approach. 21 Countries in the bottom-left corner are characterized by higher TFP and later births, relative to other countries. The trend line suggests that there exists a positive relationship between the ranks in terms of TFP and in terms of late motherhood. Highly productive economies, such as France, Italy and the Netherlands, are also characterized by a larger share of late births. On the contrary, less productive economies, such as Japan and South Korea, are also characterized by less late motherhood. Figure 4 , which relies on the dual TFP estimates, does not exhibit an 1 9 That dual approach relies on the well-known equivalence, under constant returns to scale, between total output and total factor payments, implying that the growth rate of TFP can be deduced either from the comparison of output growth with input growth (primal approach), or from the growth of factor prices (dual approach), provided one knows the share of each input in the production process.
2 0 Note that the 19 countries under study have total fertility rates that are sometimes close to the replacement rate (for instance for the US and New Zealand), but sometimes signi…cantly lower (for instance in Germany and Italy). That di¤erence is somewhat problematic, as the hypothesis we test concern economies with replacement fertility (see below).
2 1 Late fertility rate m includes here fertility between ages 35 and 49 years included.
increasing pattern. The trend line is here (weakly) decreasing, which does not support the TFP-based explanation of birth timing. Hence, the observed relationship between TFP and late motherhood does not seem to be robust to the methodology used for productivity measurement. When we take the average TFP ranking on the two approaches to productivity measurement (primal and dual), we obtain a weakly increasing relationship ( Figure 5 ). But this can hardly be regarded as a strong support for a TFP-based explanation of the observed fertility timing. The reason is that many countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Austria are very close in terms of productivity, but very distant in terms of fertility timing. Hence TFP di¤er-entials cannot be the unique factor driving the timing of births. If one restricts the sample to countries whose TFR is su¢ ciently close to the reproduction rate in 1990 (Figure 6 ), the positive relationship between TFP and late motherhood becomes slightly steeper, suggesting that intercountry heterogeneity in terms of total fertility may have caused some noise in our comparisons. More generally, those simple cross country comparisons could only inform us on the validity of the TFP-based explanation of birth timing provided all countries are identical in all other aspects, which is hardly the case. In order to avoid the di¢ culties raised by unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the next subsection will focus on a single country, the United States, and try to compare late fertility patterns and TFP patterns.
TFP and fertility timing in the U.S.
In order to assess the TFP-based hypothesis for the U.S., we will rely on TFP estimates by Fernald (2011) , and on age-speci…c fertility rate from the Human Fertility Database. Regarding the period under study, we will focus on the period after 1988, in such a way as to be as close as possible to a period with replacement fertility (TFR close to 2). As shown on Figure 7 , the proportion of births beyond age 35 has been growing strongly during that period. If we plot, in a simple diagram, the annual growth rate of the share of late fertility in total fertility, against the annual growth rate of TFP, one obtains an unambiguously increasing relationship, whatever the concept of TFP that is used. That robust increasing relationship appears on Figure 8 , which relies on TFP estimates for the whole business sector, and on Figures 9 and 10, which are based on (respectively unadjusted and utilization-adjusted) TFP estimates for consumption goods (i.e. non-equipment goods). Those simple graphs suggest that, over the period 1988-2007, the higher the annual TFP growth was, the larger the postponement of births was. This is exactly in conformity with the TFP-based rationalization outlined from the extended Barro-Becker framework.
In sum, this section does not have the pretension to show that the TFP-based explanation is valid, nor that it is better than a cost-based explanation. 22 More modestly, that section suggests that the extended Barro-Becker model is, at …rst glance, not incompatible with the data, since one of its major predications …ts the data. When one reminds that such a qualitative test sometimes su¢ ces to question the relevancy of a model -such as Doepke's (2005) rejection of the Barro-Becker model for the mortality/fertility relationship -the material provided in this section is at least encouraging for further empirical tests of the extended Barro-Becker model in the context of changing fertility timing.
Conclusions
The postponement of births constitutes a major demographic stylized fact of our times. The present paper proposed to extend the canonical fertility model of Barro and Becker (1989) , to examine whether standard economic fertility models can help us to rationalize observed fertility timing tendencies.
For that purpose, we introduced an additional reproduction period in the Barro-Becker OLG model. That extension allowed us to examine how individuals can, under dynastic altruism, solve the dilemma between early and late children. Whereas the former are consumed earlier, they are also, in general, associated with a longer period of coexistence, which may lead to additional opportunity costs in comparison to later children.
In a …rst stage, we showed that, at the temporary equilibrium, the optimal timing of births is strongly dependent on the cost structure of early and late children, in terms of goods and in terms of time. If late children are more costly than early children during their childhood, and if early children are no longer time-consuming once adult, the optimal fertility pro…le only involves early children. But if early children who become adults are, to some extent, still time-consuming for their parents, then there is some room for late children, especially if medical advances, such as assisted reproductive technologies, have reduced the direct cost of late children.
In a second stage, focusing on a stationary equilibrium with stationary population size, we showed that an improvement in TFP tends, in general, to shift steady-state optimal fertility pro…le towards more late births. Hence the extended Barro Becker model proposes not one, but two distinct plausible explanations for the postponement of births: either a change in the direct costs of early and late children, or, alternatively, a rise in TFP.
Cross country comparisons in the OECD suggest that the empirical testing of the TFP hypothesis depends signi…cantly on how productivity is measured. Focusing on the U.S., we showed that there exists a positive correlation between TFP annual growth and the annual growth of late fertility, in conformity with what the extended Barro-Becker model suggests. But further empirical investigations will have to be done in the future, to be able to assess the plausibility of the cost hypothesis and the TFP hypothesis for changes in fertility timing.
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within a given cohort, depending on the age of parents, let us derive the intertemporal budget constraint in the two cases. When the bequest is received at the death of the parent, the budget constraint of a young adult born from a young parent is:
(1 bn t )w t = c t + s t + n t e t If he receives a bequest k t+1 from his parent at his death, his budget constraint at t + 1 is:
w t+1 (1 Bm t+1 hn t )+s t (1+r t+1 )+(1+r t+1 )k t+1 = d t+1 +m t+1 E t+1 +(n t +m t+1 )k t+2
Hence his intertemporal budget constraint is:
w t (1 bn t )+ w t+1 (1 Bm t+1 hn t ) 1 + r t+1 +k t+1 = c t +n t e t + d t+1 + m t+1 E t+1 + (n t + m t+1 )k t+2 (1 + r t+1 )
For an agent born at the same time, but from an old parent, the two budget constraints are: w t (1 bn t ) + (1 + r t )k t = c t + s t + n t e t w t+1 (1 Bm t+1 hn t ) + (1 + r t+1 )s t = d t+1 + m t+1 E t+1 + (n t + m t+1 )k t+2
From which the intertemporal budget constraint is w t (1 bn t )+ w t+1 (1 Bm t+1 hn t ) 1 + r t+1 +(1+r t )k t = c t +n t e t + d t+1 + m t+1 E t+1 + (n t + m t+1 )k t+2 1 + r t+1
Thus the intertemporal budget constraint di¤ers for agents born at the same point in time, from young or old parents. The overall lifetime spending (RHS) is the same in the two cases, but the lifetime resources (LHS) di¤ers: those born from older parents bene…t from the bequests earlier in their own lifecycle, which makes them richer if one considers an economy at the steady-state (under r > 0). As a consequence, the mere passage of time would lead, under those alternative budget constraints, to an explosion of intracohort heterogeneity, between children from parents, grand-parents etc. of di¤erent ages. Thus, whether the marginal impact of raising early fertility is larger than the marginal impact of raising late fertility depends on whether the cohort size is growing over time or not. If N t > N t 1 or g t > 1, we necessarily have, everything else being unchanged, that:
Proof of Proposition 2 Note that, in general, we have: Assuming that (B b h) < 0 and e E < 0, those conditions can be rewritten as the conditions in Corollary 1.
